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Articles

I

Rights of Sexual Minorities in Ireland
and Europe: Rhetoric versus Reality*
Bruce Carolan**
I.

Introduction

The Government of Ireland and the European Union ("EU"),
through web pages and printed matter, promote a popular
perception that recent legislative changes have advanced the cause
of equality for sexual minorities in Ireland and Europe. The public
image promoted might be called "mono-thematic": "equality" is
good and we promote "equality."
The question poses itself: are these self-congratulatory images
justified? If we apply the relevant law to the affected groups, does
it achieve what might be regarded as "equality?" This essay argues
that the law fails to achieve the lowest-common-denominator
notion of equality. Application of the relevant Irish and European
law to a hypothetical fact situation, however, produces results that
are at odds with any common sense notion of equality.
* Remarks presented at the annual conference of the Law and Society
Association, Budapest, Hungary, July 3-7, 2001.
** Head of Department of Legal Studies, Dublin Institute of Technology,
Aungier Street, Dublin 2, Ireland. bruce.carolan@dit.ie
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These results are bad enough. What is worse, in my view, is
that the images created by the Irish and European Governments
lull affected groups and concerned citizens into a false sense of
security, and a complacency over the need to continue to militate
for progressive change. If the affected minority groups were
confronted with expressly anti-gay, discriminatory messages, they
likely would mount or continue high-profile campaigns designed to
affect legislative change. However, due to the false images
promoted by the relevant authorities, there is less incentive to
lobby for legislative change. Members of the affected minority
groups likely become aware that the law fails to provide a modicum
of protection when it is "too late"-that is, when they confront
discriminatory treatment and find the law deficient.
Furthermore, the bland, monothematic message discourages a
wider debate on the philosophical issue of achieving equality in a
just society. For instance, is equality achieved through tolerance of
diverse groups, or should equality require the celebration or active
inclusion of minority groups by the majority group? Instead of
fostering a wider debate, the public image gives an impression that
equality is readily knowable and is being pursued by the relevant
authorities within the Irish and EU governments.
I explore the foregoing contentions in the following ways:
First, I review the recent legislative landscape. Next, I explore
the tactics and images employed by the Irish Government and the
European Union to create the popular perception of progressive
change with respect to sexual minorities. These tactics largely
involve creation of Internet sites and distribution of printed matter
to interested parties. I describe these images employed and the
perceptions likely created by them.
I then present a hypothetical factual example of an
employment issue involving a same-sex couple. It concerns denial
of employment benefits to a same-sex partner, and the subsequent
loss of employment due to being in a same-sex relationship. It is
fair to say that this hypothetical factual example presents issues that
an average person might regard as implicating discrimination based
on sexual orientation.
Third, employing a close reading of the relevant statutory
provisions and some decisions of the Irish and European Courts, I
apply the relevant law to determine whether, and to what extent,
the law affords relief in the hypothetical situation.
My conclusion is that the results of this exercise are
counterintuitive. It is possible that, despite recent changes in the
law, a person denied employment benefits for a same-sex partner
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and fired for being in a same-sex relationship would not have a
remedy. That is, despite claims of progressive change with respect
to sexual minorities, in fact little or no relief is afforded by the
respective legislative regimes.
Thus, this paper seeks to expose a gap between rhetoric and
reality. I seek to point out that, behind the soothing rhetoric of
equality and diversity created by the manipulation of words and
images, the hard reality is that groups discriminated against are left
without a remedy. The false sense of progressive change promoted
by the public relations tools of the Irish and EU governments is
more dangerous than expressly anti-gay attitudes.
Such false
images lull affected groups into complacency, and reduce the
likelihood of effective lobbying.
Recently, Ireland has somewhat plugged this gap, and it was
not by adopting more progressive legislation. Instead, it published
a pamphlet on the rights of same-sex couples that highlighted
deficiencies in existing laws. This approach illustrates that governments might adopt a more nuanced approach to the messages they
propagate. That is, while acknowledging their mandate to promote
equality, they might also acknowledge shortcomings so as to inspire
affected individuals to militate for change. This approach also
might stir debate on the complex issue of what constitutes equality.
The European Union has not shown signs of promoting a more
complex message. Quite the opposite. The EU promotes the
empty notion of "equality" while its laws, as interpreted by the
European Court of Justice, deprive affected minorities by relying

on stereotyped notions -that the law is meant to undermine. The
EU appears to be on the way to adopting a conceptual approach to
equality for sexual minorities that would denude the term of any

real meaning. In the EU, it appears that the image is more
important then the reality.
II.

The Rhetoric

A.

The Legal Landscape

In order to evaluate recent claims of progressive legislative
change, it is helpful to survey the legislative landscape in Ireland
and the European Union with respect to sexual minorities, and to

review recent legislative changes.
1.
Irish Law-On January 30, 1997, the Bureau of
Democracy, Human Rights and Labor of the U.S. Department of
State issued a Report. The Report was entitled, "Country Report
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on Human Rights Practices for 1996 for Ireland."' The Report
generally presented a positive view of human rights practices in
Ireland. However, Section 5, entitled, "Discrimination Based on
Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, Language or Social Status," stated
that:
Except as regards employment, neither the Constitution nor the
law prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability, race, sex,
language, or social status. [Note that the report does not even
acknowledge the concept of discrimination against sexual
minorities.] To address these and other shortcomings in Irish
civil law, the Government in 1993 created the Department of
Equality and Law Reform. The Department has drafted an
equal status bill and an employment equality bill, but neither bill
was passed by year's end. The Constitution, as amended,
already forbids state promotion of one religion over another and
discrimination on the grounds of religious profession, belief, or
status.2
With regard to private employment, there was an extensive
regulatory regime designed to protect Irish citizens against unfair
dismissal. However, this regime did not protect against claims of
anti-gay discrimination.3
The lack of protection against anti-gay discrimination became
clear in a case arising in the early 1990's in Cork, Ireland. A female
employee of a Leisure Centre was dismissed from employment
after a patron complained that she had seen this employee kiss
another woman in the changing room. The terminated employee
brought an unfair dismissal action against the Leisure Centre. The
hearing officer concluded that the employee would not have been
dismissed if she had been reported for kissing a man at work.
Therefore, the dismissal was due to the employee's homosexuality.
1. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and
Labor, Country Report on Human Rights Practicesfor 1996 for Ireland, Jan. 30,
(last
1997, available at http://www.usis.usemb.se/human/human96/ireland.html
visited Oct. 11, 2001).
2. Id. at § 5.
3. Unlike American law, Irish law does not provide for employment at will.
Instead, after one year of employment, an employee is protected against unfair
dismissal by the Unfair Dismissal Act. See Unfair Dismissal Act of 1977, available
at http://www.bailii.org/ie/legis/numact/uda1977198/ (last visited Aug. 24, 2001);
Also, see Unfair Dismissal Act (Amendment), 1993, available at http://www
.bailii.org/ie/legis/num-act/uda1993278/ (last visited Aug. 24, 2001). Employees
who believe their employment has been wrongly terminated may bring a claim in
front of an employment tribunal. See Unfair Dismissal Act, § 7, 1977. These
proceedings are relatively prompt and inexpensive, and typically, biased in favor of
the employee. The awards are relatively modest by U.S. standards.
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In other words, the employee had been treated unfairly when her
situation was compared to that of a similarly-situated heterosexual
employee. However, the hearing officer concluded that Irish
employment law did not protect against anti-gay discrimination and
ruled in favor of the Leisure Centre.
However, since the middle of the 1990's, there ostensibly has
been a flurry of legislative activity directed towards protecting
against anti-gay discrimination.
Perhaps the most significant legislative activity has been the
adoption of an Employment Equality Act' and an Equal Status
Act.' Ostensibly, these Acts of Irish legislation purport to prohibit
discrimination in employment and public accommodation situations
on a variety of grounds, including sexual orientation. These Acts
also created an Equality Authority The presentation of these Acts
by the Equality Authority, and a close reading of these Acts in the
context of a hypothetical factual situation will be discussed below.
2. Law of the European Union-On the surface,
developments in the European Union have been even more
dramatic than developments in Ireland.
Until recently, there were no Articles of the European
Community Treaty or the Treaty of European Union (the two
treaties underpinning the European Union) that expressly
addressed sexual orientation. There was no secondary legislation
that addressed sexual orientation. The Council of Ministers8 and
the European Commissiong-roughly termed the "legislature" of
the European Union-took the view (in response to questions
posed by the European Parliament) that the then European
Community lacked competence to legislate anti-discrimination
measures designed to prevent anti-gay discrimination.
The Community has no power to intervene in possible cases of
discrimination practiced by Member States against sexual minorities. The powers deriving from the Treaties allow the Community
to intervene only in respect of discrimination on the grounds of
nationality or in order to ensure equal treatment for male and
female workers in the field of labor relations and social security."°
4. Employment Equality Act of 1998, available at http://www.bailii.org
/ie/legis/num-act/eea1998251/ (last visited Aug. 24, 2001).
5. Equal Status Act of 2000, available at http://www.dredf.org
/symposium/EqualAct.pdf (last visited Aug. 24, 2001).
6. Id. at § 3(2)(d).
7. Id. at Part IV.
8. Reply of the Council of Ministers, Doc. No. 2134/83.
9. Reply of the European Commission, Doc. No. 121.
10. See id.
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The Court of Justice underscored this point when it ruled in
Case C-24/96, Lisa Grant v. Southwest Trains, that the law of the
European Union, as it then stood, did not afford protection against
anti-gay discrimination in employment. (This ruling came despite a
ruling in an early case, C-13/94, P v. S. and Cornwall County
Council, which determined that EC law prohibited employment
discrimination based on transsexuality.)
However, in amendments to the European Community Treaty
brought about by the Treaty of Amsterdam, 1997, the European
Community obtained express power to legislate against discrimination based on sexual orientation. Article 13 provided:
Without prejudice to the other provisions of this Treaty and
within the limits of the powers conferred by it upon the
Community, the Council, acting unanimously on a proposal
from the Commission and after consulting with the European
Parliament, may take appropriate action to combat
discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or
belief, disability, age or sexual orientation."
Pursuant to the powers afforded under Article 13, the
Commission has proposed a Council Directive establishing a
General Framework for Equal Treatment in Employment and
Occupation. 2 The preamble to the Directive provides:
Discrimination based on... sexual orientation may undermine
the achievement of the objectives of the Treaty establishing the
European Community, in particular the attainment of a high
level of employment and of social protection, the raising of the
standard of living and quality of life, economic and social
cohesion an solidarity, and the fostering of free movement of
13
persons.
To this end any direct or indirect discrimination based on...
sexual orientation.., should be prohibited throughout the
Community.
Harassment which produces an intimidating,
hostile, offensive or disturbing work environment in relation to

11.

TREATY OF AMSTERDAM AMENDING THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION,

THE TREATIES ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AND CERTAIN
RELATED AcTs, Oct. 2, 1997, O.J. (C 340) (1997) [hereinafter THE TREATY OF
AMSTERDAM], art. 13.

12.
13.

Council Directive 2000/78/EC, 2000 O.J. (L 303) 16.
Id. $11.
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should
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to

be

In addition, in the run up to the European Summit at Nice,
France, which produced the Treaty of Nice, the European Union
debated the creation and adoption of a Charter of Fundamental
Rights. 5 Ultimately, the participants from EU Member States
adopted such a Charter at the Nice Summit.
The Charter contains a number of provisions that are relevant
to consideration of anti-gay discrimination. Chapter III of the
Charter concerns "equality" and Article 21 pertains to "Nondiscrimination." Article 21, the most significant provision with
respect to anti-gay discrimination, provides, in relevant part: "Any
discrimination
based on ... sexual
orientation
shall be
prohibited."16
The overall impression one might obtain from reviewing these
legal provisions is that of a progressive move towards increased
protection of sexual minorities from discrimination based on sexual
orientation. Of course, most Irish and European citizens will not
refer to the primary texts of these legal provisions, but will instead
rely on material disseminated by government and EU officials. The
next section of this paper describes the materials distributed by
these sources of information, and the likely impression created by
these materials.
B.

Irish and EU Images of Equality

1.
Ireland-The Equality Authority of Ireland provides
information to the public through a web page and through printed

matter distributed to interested parties. This information will form
the basis of understanding for the majority of Irish citizens,
including those who might need to avail themselves of Equality
Authority's services. This section of the essay explores the images
employed and the likely impressions created.
The Authority's web page employs images and simple
messages designed to inform interested parties of the nature of the
Equality Authority, its responsibilities and the state of Irish law
with respect to discrimination based on, among other things, sexual

orientation. 7
14. Id. 12.
15. Charter of Fundamental Human Rights, 2000/C, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 1.
16. See id. at art. 21.
17. The Equality Authority, Equality in a Diverse Ireland, available at
http://www.equality.ie/dynamichome.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2001).
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The home web page for the Equality Authority includes four
photographic images." An older person hunches over a book, a
person of African heritage stares off into the middle distance in a
thoughtful pose, a mother cradling an infant in arms clicks on a
mouse while talking on the telephone, and a two women cuddle,
front-to-back, in a playful, flirtatious pose.19
Beneath these images appear the words, "The Equality
Authority, Equality in a Diverse Ireland," and "Welcome to the
Equality Authority Homepage."2 °
A click on the mouse brings a web browser to an index of web
sites, including a "Mission Statement," "9 Grounds for Discrimination," "Meet the Board," "Guest Book," and "Links." 2'
The Mission Statement provides that:
[tihe Equality Authority is committed to realizing positive
change in the situation of those experiencing inequality by: 1.
Promoting and defending the rights established in the equality
legislation, AND, 2. Providing leadership in-building a
commitment to addressing equality issues in practice-creating
a wider awareness of equality issues-celebrating the diversity
in Irish society-mainstreaming equality considerations across
all sectors.22
Another click takes us to a page entitled, "Discrimination,"
23
and purports to answer the question, "What is Discrimination?
The web surfer may "click on a topic to learn more about it" and is
invited to learn more about "Discrimination" generally as well as
"Indirect discrimination," "What to24 do if you are discriminated
against," "Relief," "Time limits," etc.
Under "What is Discrimination," the web page provides that
"The [Employment Equality] Act prohibits direct and indirect
discrimination on nine grounds."25 It lists sexual orientation as one
of the nine grounds. It further provides that "All aspects of

18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. The Equality Authority, About Us, available at http://www.equality.ie
aboutus.shtml (last visited Aug. 24, 2001).
22. The Equality Authority, Mission Statement, available at http://www
.equality.ie/mission.shtml (last visited Aug. 24, 2001).
23. The Equality Authority, What is Discrimination?,available at http://www
.equality.ie/whatis.shtml (last visited Aug. 24, 2001).
24. Id.
25. Id.
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as "conditions of
employment are covered," including such items
26
employment," "promotion" and "dismissal.,
It further provides a more detailed description of
"Discrimination." It states that "[a] person is said to be discriminated against if she/he is treated less favorably than another
is....

,,21

With respect to "discrimination based on sexual orient-

ation," it states that "the comparison must be between a person of a
particular sexual orientation, and one who has a different sexual
orientation.... ."28
2. European Union Images of Equality-The European
Union web sites employ equally lofty language and images in
support of the general concept of equality. Some of these occur in
the context of equality based on sexual orientation.
For example, the web site for the Council of Ministers has a
link to the Draft Charter on Fundamental Rights of the European
Union.2 9 The purpose of the web site is to keep the public informed
of developments and to allow contributions in the creation of the
recently-adopted Charter of Fundamental Rights. It likely creates
the impression that the Council is concerned with the issue of
equality and committed to the idea of a diverse European society.
The introduction to the Council's comments on the Charter
notes that the protection of fundamental rights "is a founding
principle of the European Union" and "an indispensable
prerequisite for its legitimacy."3 The introduction excerpts from
the Treaty on European Union ("TEU") [Article 6 (ex. Article F)]
to the effect that "the Union is founded on the principles of liberty,
democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms,
and the rule of law."'" It also quotes the TEU as providing that
"the Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights" 32
The Charter itself provides that "the Union is founded on the
indivisible, universal values of human dignity, freedom, equality

26. Id.
27. Id.
28. The Equality Authority, supra note 22.
29. The European Union, Council of the European Union, available at
http://ue.eu.int/ en/Info/eurocouncil/index.htm (last visited Aug. 24, 2001).
30. The European Union, Introduction to the Charterof FundamentalRights of
the European Union, available at http:/ue.eu.int/DF/intro.asp?lang=en (last visited
Aug. 24, 2001).
31. Id.
32. Id.
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and solidarity." Furthermore, "it places the individual at the heart
of its activities ...

.

Article 21 of the Charter concerns "Non-discrimination" and
provides that "[a]ny discrimination based on any ground such as
sexual orientation shall be prohibited....
The European Commission has proposed a Council Directive
Establishing a General Framework for Equal Treatment in
Employment and Occupation.35 The Proposal accompanying the
draft directive, designed to implement principles of non-discrimination enumerated in Article 13, continues the themes of equality for
all contained in other Community propaganda. 6 It notes that "[t]he
fight against discrimination constitutes a major challenge for the
European Union."37 It specifically notes that "[d]iscrimination on

the basis of sexual orientation also occurs in various forms in the
workplace. The problems of workplace discrimination arising from
sexual orientation and the lack of legal protection at the EU level
were highlighted
in a recent decision of the European Court of
38
Justice.
In light of the foregoing, a member of a sexual minority living
in Ireland might feel fairly secure under Irish and European law.
However, the following hypothetical illustrates otherwise.
III. The Reality
A. Hypothetical FactualSituation

For our hypothetical, perhaps we can imagine the same-sex
couple pictured on the web page of the Irish Equality Authority.
Call them Jill and Barbara. Jill is a British national and Barbara an
American citizen. They are living together in London when Jill is
transferred to Dublin, Ireland, to take up a position as a software
consultant in the booming Irish economy.
After moving to Ireland, Jill works without incident for a
period of months. Eventually, Jill learns that her employer
provides free software to the spouses of its employees. She
approaches her boss and explains that her "spouse," Barbara,
whom the boss has met at previous firm functions, is an aspiring
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id.
Id.
Council Directive 2000/78/EC, 2000 O.J. (L 303) 16.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing Case C-249/86, Grant v. Southwest Trains, 1998 E.C.R. 1-62).
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writer and would benefit from some of the software packages made
available to spouses of employees. The boss tells her he will get
back to her.
The boss has noticed Jill and Barbara at firm functions, but did
not realize they were lovers. At the next such function, he watches
the two of them more closely. He notes them holding hands and at
one point stealing a kiss at the function.
The following Monday, Jill receives a memo from her boss. It
says that the employer only provides free software to spouses, and
that, as Jill's same-sex partner, Barbara does not qualify under this
policy as a spouse.
The memorandum goes on to note that the employer did not
realize that Jill was in a same-sex relationship when she was
employed. The memorandum states that her employer does not
approve of relationships outside traditional marriage, and that he or
the company does not wish to take steps indicating approval of such
relationships. The memo states that granting free software might
be seen as approving relationships outside marriage, and therefore,
the policy is limited to spouses in the legally defined sense of the
term.
Furthermore, the memorandum states that employing
someone in a same-sex relationship might be seen as approving this
immoral arrangement and, for that reason, Jill's employment is
being terminated, effective immediately.
The memorandum
concludes by thanking Jill for her hard work, and wishes her good
luck in her future endeavors.
Jill, shocked, notifies the Irish Equality Authority, and seeks
advice regarding her rights under European Community law. To
determine the likelihood of success, we must look beyond the
rhetoric of equality contained in web pages and welcoming
brochures, and engage in a close reading of the relevant statutes.
Recent case law also might indicate how vague principles of
equality might be interpreted and applied by the Courts.
B. Irish Law
Surprisingly, Irish law would offer little protection to Jill in
these circumstances. Neither the denial of employment benefits to
Jill's partner, nor the termination of Jill's employment for being
part of a non-traditional relationship would appear to constitute
acts of discrimination based on sexual orientation under Irish law.
1. Denial of Benefits to Jill's Partner-Section 34 of the
Employment Equality Act, 1998, is entitled, "Savings and
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exceptions related to the family, age or disability."3 9 This section
essentially provides exceptions to the general prohibitions against
discrimination-such as discrimination based on sexual orientation
-that might otherwise apply.'
Section 34(1) (b) provides that nothing contained in the
relevant sections of the Employment Equality Act shall make it
unlawful for an employer to provide a benefit to a person "in
respect of a person as a members of an employee's family."4
But isn't Barbara, in a very real sense, a member of Jill's
family? Again, not according to the Employment Equality Act.
Section 2 of the Act provides definitions, and Section 2(1) provides
that "member of the family" in relation to any person, means, "(a)
that person's spouse, or (b) a brother, sister, uncle, aunt, nephew,
niece, lineal ancestor or lineal descendant of that person or that
person's spouse.""
The Act does not define spouse. It is likely, however, that the
Irish courts, in interpreting that phrase, would refer to its definition
under Irish law. No Irish cases have held that "spouse" extends to a
same sex partner.
Thus, despite the Act's surface or superficial prohibition
against discrimination based on sexual orientation, the combined
effect of Section 34 and the definitions section of the Act operate to
exclude from its protection the type of discrimination of which Jill
complains. 3
2.
Termination of Jill's Employment- Would
the
Employment Equality Act regard the termination of Jill's
employment by reason of her being part of a same-sex relationship
as constituting discrimination based on sexual orientation? The
answer is not altogether clear. Definitions contained in the Act and
debates in the Irish Senate highlighted a likely deficiency in the law.
It is possible that this form of discrimination would not be viewed
as sexual orientation discrimination. It is possible, in fact, that this
type of discrimination would not be prohibited at all.
In Senate Debates in the Irish legislature, Senator Brendan
Ryan questioned the Minister for Justice, Mr. John O'Donaghue. 4
In response to these questions, the Minister conceded that
discrimination against a lesbian or gay man for living with another
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Employment Equality Act, § 34 (1998).
Id.
Id. at § 34(1)(b).
Id. at § 2.
Employment Equality Act, § 34 (1998).
154 Seanad Deb. Col. 371-74 (Feb. 18, 1998).
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person of the same sex would not constitute sexual orientation
discrimination under the Act. This would be discrimination based
on cohabiting.
What, then, does the Act provide regarding discrimination
based on cohabiting?
The Act does not prohibit discrimination against someone on
the basis that they are cohabiting with a member of the same sex.
Instead, the Act only prohibits discrimination based on marital
status, and, according to the definitions provided in the Act, marital
status does not include cohabiting couples.45

The definition section of the Act, Section 2, provides that
"'4marital status' means single, married, separated, divorced or
widowed.'" 46 Thus, marital status discrimination occurs only if a
person is discriminated against because she is single, married,
separated, divorced or widowed. Discrimination against someone
based on cohabitation does not constitute marital status discrimination, because such a person is not being discriminated against by
reason of being single, married, separated, divorced or widowed.
Senator David Norris railed against this anomaly in the Senate
debates, in support of amendments to expressly prohibit this type of
discrimination. To quote Senator Norris, "[i]f I were an employer, I
would say I did not discriminate against you because you are single,
married, divorced, separated or widowed but 4because
you are a pair
7
of fairies living together and I did not like it.
According to Senator Norris's reading of the Act, this type of
practice is not outlawed.
The Irish Government resisted efforts to amend the definition
of marital status to include cohabiting couples. Minister for Justice
John O'Donaghue said "[t]his legislation seeks to ensure equality in
employment and to eliminate prejudice and discrimination. It does
not seek to change the marital status of individuals or provide for
different types of marital status.

48

Perhaps this quote most starkly illustrates the gap between the
rhetoric of equality and the reality as experienced by those who
suffer discriminatory practice. On the one hand, the Irish Attorney
General can praise the legislation as designed to eliminate
prejudice and discrimination, while simultaneously arguing that
terminating a lesbian by reason of her participation in a same-sex

45.
46.
47.
48.

Employment Equality Act § 6(2)(b).
Id.
154 Seanad Deb. Col. 380 (Feb. 18, 1998).
Id. at Col. 379.
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partnership does not constitute employment discrimination against
her on the basis of her sexual orientation.
Might Jill try to argue that she is being discriminated against by
reason of her family status? Again, her argument is defeated at the
outset, by a definition that provides that "family status" means
"responsibility (a) as a parent or as a person in loco parentis in
relation to a person who has not attained the age of 18 years, or (b)
as a parent or the resident primary career in relation to a person of
or over that age with a disability which is of such a nature as to give
rise to the need49 for care or support on a continuing, regular or
frequent basis.,
The Act is deficient in other respects. For one thing, the Act
itself discriminates, depending upon the type of discrimination
suffered. For example, someone who suffers discrimination based
on sexual orientation is limited to two years back pay for relief.
Someone who suffers discrimination based on sex does not face a
similar "cap" on relief. The Act also provides exceptions or
loopholes for those accused of sexual orientation discrimination.
For example, the Act allows Irish religious institutions to treat
certain individuals more favorably than based on their religion and
allows these institutions to "take action against" individuals who
"threaten the ethos" of the institution. When one considers that
hospitals and schools can be considered "religious institutions" for
the purposes of the Act, these are potentially far reaching
exceptions.
C. European Community Law
Perhaps Jill could seek to invoke European Community law,
by reason of her having moved to Ireland from the UK in order to
take up a job. Would she fare any better?
1. Denial of Employment Benefits and Termination of
Employment-It is not clear that Jill would do any better under EC
law. In Grant v. Southwest Trains,0 Lisa Grant complained when
she was refused travel benefits for her same-sex partner." The man
who had occupied the job before her had obtained travel benefits
for his live-in girlfriend, but the company policy limited such travel
concessions to married couples or to "opposite sex" couples in longterm relationships.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Employment Equality Act, § 2 (1998).
Case C-249/96, Grant v. Southwest Trains, 1998 E.C.R. 1-62.
Id. 1$ 7-8.
Id. 9.
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In other words, the policy did not simply distinguish between
married and unmarried couples (as is the case in many employee
benefit policies). Instead, it distinguished between same-sex and
opposite-sex couples; the latter included both married and
unmarried individuals. Ms Grant took an action in the UK national
court, and the national court referred a question to the European
Court of Justice.
The European Court of Justice concluded that EC law,
particularly the general principle of EC law providing for equality
of citizens and non-discrimination, did not prohibit discrimination
against lesbians or gay men. Thus, in the Court's view, the practice
of restricting benefits to opposite-sex couples did not violate EC
law, because EC law did not prohibit anti-gay discrimination. The
Court reached this conclusion despite its ruling in an earlier case,
Case C-13/94, P & S and Cornwall Council, that general principles
of equality implicit in EC law prohibited discrimination against
transsexuals.
The Court of Justice cited the pending Treaty of Amsterdam
amendment, Article 13, which would have expressly empowered
the Council of Ministers to adopt EC legislation outlawing
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. In essence, the
Court of Justice handed the issue to the Council for a legislative
solution.
But would the pending Directive Establishing a General
Framework for Equal Treatment" actually prohibit the type of
discrimination of which Lisa Grant complained? Maybe not.
There are several ominous soundings contained in the
comments accompanying the proposed directive. The Commission
notes, at page 8 of the commentary accompanying the proposal:
With regard to sexual orientation, a clear dividing line should be
drawn between sexual orientation, which is covered by this
proposal, and sexual behaviour, which is not. Furthermore, it
should be underlined that this proposal does not affect marital
status and therefore it does not impinge upon entitlements to
benefits for married couples."

53. The Court reached this conclusion despite its ruling in an earlier case, Case
C-13/94, P v. S and Cornwall Council, 1996 E.C.R. 1-2143, that general principles
of equality implicit in EC law prohibited discrimination against transsexuals.
54. Commission Proposal for a Directive Establishing a General Framework
for Equal Treatment Between Persons, COM(1999) 565.

55. Id. at 8.
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Thus, in defense of a claim of sexual orientation discrimination
under the Directive, one could argue that one was not discriminating against Jill by reason of her status as a lesbian, but rather by
reason of her sexual behavior of being in a relationship with
another woman.
Furthermore, one might follow the lead provided in the second
sentence of the Commission commentary and argue that one is not
discriminating against Jill by reason of her sexual orientation, but
rather by reason of her being in an unconventional same-sex
relationships.56
In fact, the Commission already has expressed the opinion that
the discrimination faced by Jill is not sexual orientation
discrimination. In the Grant case, the Court considered whether
refusing travel concessions to Grant's same-sex partner constituted
57
The Commission made a
sexual orientation discrimination.
submission to the Court. The Court summarized the Commission's
position as follows:
In its opinion .. , the discrimination of which Ms Grant
complains is based not on her sexual orientation but on the fact
that she is not living as a 'couple' or with a 'spouse,' as those
terms are understood in the laws of most Member States, in
Community law and in the law of the Convention. It considers
in those circum-stances the difference of treatment applied by
the regulations in force in the undertaking
in which Ms. Grant
8
works is not contrary to Article 119.1
Therefore, in the opinion of the European Commission, which
is responsible for drafting the law designed to prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation, it does not constitute sexual
orientation discrimination to deny employment benefits to the
same-sex partner of a worker. This is true even where those
benefits are granted to the unmarried opposite-sex partner of a
worker.
Of course, even though the Commission drafts the directive,
and its views will be highly influential, it will not have the last word
on the interpretation of this directive. The Court will have the last
word as to whether this constitutes sexual orientation discrimination. It seems unlikely the Court will prove more generous.
In D & Sweden v. Council of the European Union, the Court of
First Instance (which considers disputes between employees and
56.

See id.

57. Case C-249/96, Grant v. Southwest Trains, 1998 E.C.R. 1-62.
58. Id. T 23
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Community institutions in the first instance), considered a claim by
an employee of the Council of the European Union. 9 The
individual, D, had a registered partnership with his same-sex
partner under the laws of Sweden. According to Sweden, which
intervened on behalf of D, this provided essentially all the same
rights and obligations as in a civil marriage between opposite-sex
partners.60
D sought supplemental employee benefits that the Council
provided to married employees. The Council refused to provide
these, and D sued.61

While the case was pending, the Council adopted regulations
prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation, but the
Court did not consider these in reaching its decision.
The Court of First Instance ruled in favor of the Council of
Ministers. It refused to assess the Council's behavior against the
later-adopted regulations prohibiting discrimination based on
sexual orientation, but, if their reasoning was the same as the
Commission in Grant, that would not have made a difference.
Instead, the Court stated that:
an employer is not obliged to accord to the situation of a person
maintaining, like the claimant, a stable relationship with a
partner of the same sex, even if this has been the object of
official registration with a national agency, the benefits
devolving from the civil status of a2 person engaged in the
relationship of a traditional marriage.
The case was appealed to the European Court of Justice.
However, D and Sweden fared no better there. In fact, preliminary
observations suggest that, from a human rights perspective, the
situation deteriorated on appeal.
Advocate General Mishco delivered his opinion in the case on
22 February 2001.63 He recommended that the Court affirm the
judgment of the Court of First Instance.' He argued that there is
no protection for same-sex couples by reason of the general
59. Case T-294/97, D & Kingdom of Sweden v. Council of the European
Union, Judgment of the Court of First Instance, 28 January 1999.
60. Id. 22.
61. Id.
5. While the case was pending the Council adopted regulations
prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation.
62. Id. 29

63. Cases C-122/99P & C-125/99P, D & Kingdom of Sweden v. Council of the
European Union, Recommendation of Advocate General Mischo, 22 February
2001, (O.J. 2001, 6200/21).

64. Id. 119.
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principle of equal treatment under EC law. His argument was
based on his conclusion that differences "in nature" between same
sex and opposite sex couples render the situations dissimilar;
therefore, unequal treatment does not violate the principle that like
cases should be treated alike.65
What about the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, adopted
with the Treaty of Nice? This was of no use to the claimant, and, in
fact, worked against his position. First, the Charter is not a legally
binding document, and can not be relied upon as an enforceable
law.
Second, the Advocate General relied upon the Explanatory
Memorandum accompanying the Charter of Fundamental Rights to
justify his conclusion that the claimant had not been discriminated
against. Mischo cited that portion of the Charter that states that
there is no obligation to require same-sex marriages as a result of
the Charter.
The Court of Justice followed the recommendation of the
Advocate General and affirmed the judgement of the Court of First
Instance.'
Concerning the argument, put forth by Sweden, Denmark and
the Netherlands, that denying these benefits violated the general
principle of equality under Community law, by discriminating
against D by reason of his sexual orientation, the Court wrote:
[a]s regards infringement of the principle of equal treatment of

officials irrespective of their sexual orientation, it is clear that it
is not the sex of the partner which determines whether the
household allowance is granted, but the legal nature of the ties
between the official and the partner. 61
It should be noted that, although the discussion of Community
law thus far has been in the context of the denial of employment
benefits for a same-sex spouse, the conceptualization of discrimination based on sexual orientation would deny relief to one who
was terminated by reason of being in a same-sex partnership. That
is, this would not be seen as a form of sexual orientation discrimination, and, because same-sex couples are, by their very nature,
different from opposite sex couples (even unmarried opposite sex

65. Id. 80.
66. Cases C-122/99P & C-125/99P, D & Kingdom of Sweden v. Council of the
European Union, Judgment of Court of Justice of the European Communities, 31
May 2001, (O.J. 2001, 6200/21).
67. Id. $ 42.
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couples), there is no violation of the basic principle of equality that
like cases must be treated alike.
IV. Conclusion
The public image presented by Ireland and EU-with regard
to the attitudes towards lesbians and gay men-is that of a modern,
progressive, caring government, devoted to principles of diversity,
inclusiveness and non-discrimination. The web site for the Irish
Equality Authority goes so far as to portray a same-sex couple in an
amorous embrace.
However, a close reading of the relevant legislation and case
law reveals that the law does not protect same-sex couples.
The reasoning behind the decisions reveals a true perversion of
the common-sense notion of equality. It reminds one of the phrase,
'The law, in its majesty, prohibits the rich as well as the poor from
sleeping under bridges.' Except in this case, the reasoning is
dangerously close to being, 'The law, in its majesty, prohibits
heterosexuals as well as homosexuals from forming same-sex
partnerships.' It is only a small step to refusing to see criminal
penalties for same-sex conduct as not violating principles of
equality, because these penalties apply equally to heterosexuals and
homosexuals.
However, the public image of progressive change poses an
even greater threat. It lulls affected groups and concerned
individuals into a sense of complacency, and diminishes militant
action for change.
Only recently has the Irish Government adopted a more
nuanced approach to the issue of presenting images of law to the
public. In a widely publicized document entitled, "Partnership
rights of same sex couples," the Equality Authority audited the
legal situation of same sex couples. The results can be summarized
from the introduction:
It will be seen that a wide range of legal privileges and
obligations are triggered by the status of marriage.
Interestingly, in a small but growing number of recent legislative
provisions, some significant consequences have been attached to
the status of "living together as husband and wife" without
being formally married. Although the matter has not been
tested in the courts, it appears that this formula does not
encompass same sex couples.

68.

See infra pp. 1-2.
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Although the report does not make any recommendations, and
does not express an opinion whether differential treatment conceptually equals sexual orientation discrimination, it does indicate that
governments can present a more complex view of the status of
equality claims by minority groups, without forfeiting the broader
commitment to the general principles of equality.

